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ST A TE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Fergerson, Michael Facility: Mohawk CF 
NYSID: 





Mario J. Guitierrez, Esq. 
11 Court Street · 
Auburn, NY 13021 
05-007-19 B 
April 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24 months, 
Board Member(s) · Smith, Coppola, Drake 
who participated~-·----~~-- ~-~--~-~--------------~---~-~~~-~~~-~~.-.....-
Papers considered: . Appellant's Brief received October 1, 2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement .of the Appeals Unit's Findings and R.ecornmendatton 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
_ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to------""-
_.}om.missioner 
~ ' '~med _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview ·- Modified to ___ _ 
~L _ Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto . 
Th!s Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit' s Findings and the sep~arate :fu:id~ngs of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the ~ate and the Irunate' s Counsel, if any, on Jl ;?IJ.O~O (!!$> . 
D.istribution: Appeals Unit -Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(~) (11/2018) 
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Appellant challenges the April 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. The instant offense involved Appellant approaching the female victim as she 
entered her apartment building, sexually abusing her, and attempting to rape her. Appellant raises 
the following issues: 1) the Board concentrated mainly on the seriousness of the instant offense; 
2) the Board improperly relied on Appellant’s criminal record including a robbery that occurred 
30 years ago; 3) the Board improperly characterized Appellant’s account as changing during the 
interview; 4) the Board’s departure from the COMPAS score for low history of violence was an 
example of the Board focusing on who Appellant was 30 years ago and not on who he is today; 
and 5) the Board relied on erroneous information in denying parole. These arguments are without 
merit.  
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for 
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). In this case, the appellant received an 
EEC, therefore the deprecation standard does not apply here. 
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is 
discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 
2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997). The 
Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter of 
Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st Dept. 2007).  In the absence 
of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be 
presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 
680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 
A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 
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157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 
128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
 
An EEC does not automatically entitle an inmate to discretionary release or eliminate 
consideration of the statutory factors including the instant offense.  Matter of Corley v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of 
Pearl v. New York State Div. of Parole, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of White v. Dennison, 29 A.D.3d 1144, 814 N.Y.S.2d 393 (3d Dept. 2006).  Moreover, the 
Board is not required to give each factor equal weight.  Matter of Corley, 33 A.D.3d 1142, 1143, 
822 N.Y.S.2d 817, 818; Matter of Pearl, 25 A.D.3d 1058, 808 N.Y.S.2d 816, 817.  The Board may 
deny release to parole on a finding that there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is 
released, the inmate will not live and remain at liberty without violating the law and that his release 
is not compatible with the welfare of society.  Correction Law § 805; Matter of Heitman v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 214 A.D.2d 673, 625 N.Y.S.2d 264 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Salcedo 
v. Ross, 183 A.D.2d 771, 771, 583 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (2d Dept. 1992); Matter of Walker v. Russi, 
176 A.D.2d 1185, 576 N.Y.S.2d 51 (3d Dept. 1991), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 89 7, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1992). 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the 
appropriate factors, including: the instant offense of Attempted Rape in the first degree and Sexual 
Abuse in the first degree; the fact that Appellant absconded for twenty years after being arrested 
and posting bail; Appellant’s criminal history including a prior state sentence for Attempted 
Robbery in the second degree; his institutional efforts including  receipt of an EEC and completion 
of SOP; and release plans to live with his mother and work as a heating and air/refrigeration 
technician or in maintenance and apartment management. The Board also had before it and 
considered, among other things, the COMPAS instrument, the case plan, and letters of support and 
other document submissions. 
 
After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release 
would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  In reaching its 
conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offense representing an escalation of unlawful 
conduct, the fact that Appellant absconded for twenty years, and Appellant’s minimization of his 
actions during the instant offense. See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 
A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 
343 (2012); Matter of Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d 
Dept.), lv. denied, 6 N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997); 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Fergerson, Michael DIN: 15-A-0786  
Facility: Mohawk CF AC No.:  05-007-19 B 
    
Findings: (Page 3 of 4) 
 
Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d 
Dept. 2018); Matter of Serrano v. N.Y. State Exec. Dep’t-Div. of Parole, 261 A.D.2d 163, 164, 
689 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dept. 1999). 
 
The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to Appellant’s criminal record, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990). That Appellant’s 
conviction for Attempted Robbery in the second degree occurred 30 years ago does not provide a 
basis to disturb the Board’s decision.  
 
Appellant’s contention that the Board improperly characterized Appellant’s account as 
changing during the interview is without merit. The transcript reveals that during the interview, 
Appellant went from stating, “I never, like, put a hand on her,” (Tr. at 7.) to conceding that he tried 
to grab the victim and touched her arm. (Tr. at 9-10.) 
 
There is also no merit to Appellant’s claim that the Board’s departure from the COMPAS score 
for low history of violence was an example of the Board focusing on who he was 30 years ago and 
not on who he is today. Specifically, the Board disagreed with the low score for history of violence 
in light of Appellant’s criminal record – his prior conviction for Attempted Robbery involved him 
pointing a handgun at the victim.  In so doing, the Board provided an explanation consistent with 9 
NYCRR § 8002.2(a). The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); 
Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  
This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a).   However, the 
COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the 
Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors 
and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board 
conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the 
instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board 
is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. 
Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an 
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additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes 
of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of 
Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. 
Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  
 
As for Appellant’s contention that the Board relied on erroneous information in denying parole, 
the misstatement in the Board determination did not rise to a level where it affected the Board’s 
decision, and as such any alleged error would be deemed harmless such that no new proceeding is 
required.  Matter of Rossney v. New York State Div. of Parole, 267 A.D.2d 648, 649, 699 N.Y.S.2d 
319 (3d Dept. 1999), lv. denied, 94 N.Y.2d 759, 705 N.Y.S.2d 6 (2000). While the decision 
mistakenly characterizes Appellant’s actions as “not facing incarceration once convicted” it is 
clear from the interview transcript that the Board was aware of, referring to, and concerned with 
the fact that Appellant absconded for twenty years after being arrested and posting bail.  (Tr. at 3-
4, 14.) 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
